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Abstract 
Fraud and misconduct in financial markets have recently 
become a key regulatory issue against the backdrop of the 
financial crisis. This paper investigates the sanctions policy 
and practices of the French financial regulator, Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (AMF). It argues that, over time, the AMF 
has shifted from substantive to procedural regulation of 
finance. This shift consists in departing from sanctions based 
on observed outcomes in the market and, instead, assessing 
how the internal organizational schemes of financial firms 
actually perform. The AMF's new policy and practice involves 
a process of legalization of organizations; it also evidences a 
tendency to delegate regulation to financial firms themselves 
Key-words: Financial market, substantive regulation, 
procedural deterrence, legalization of organization 
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Fraud and misconduct in financial markets have recently 
become a key regulatory issue against the backdrop of the 
financial crisis, as evidenced by recent issues of major journals 
(e.g. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 38, 2013). The 
purpose and scope of financial market regulation are often 
discussed in terms of the gap between, on the one hand, 
national legislation and regulation and, on the other hand, 
interconnected and globalized markets. The development of 
high-frequency trading raises another major regulatory issue:  
several authors consider the internal “discreete regulation” of 
the financial industry as the real regulatory process for finance, 
which narrows the scope of public regulation (Huault & 
Richard, 2012). All countries with highly developed financial 
industries implement a policy of punishing market participants 
that do not comply with prevailing laws and regulation 
(Demerens & al., 2014). The penalty policies enforced by 
financial supervisors form the core of this paper. 
Sanctions usually have several objectives: to deter fraud, 
compensate for harm, and punish white-collar crime. A large 
part of the economic and financial literature on sanctions 
focuses more on their purpose than on what they consist of and 
who is sanctioned. This is one of the issues we raise in this 
paper.  
Our argument is that financial regulation can be split into two 
types, which we call “substantive” and “procedural”. What we 
mean by substantive regulation is that the scope is limited to 
outcomes, which are punished in and of themselves. With 
procedural regulation, however, the outcome is considered as 
the result of an internal decision-making process, which must 
be addressed as such. We therefore give a specific meaning to 
the concepts of procedure and proceduralization, as regards the 
legal-political post-modernist analysis of law (see Frydman, 
1998, for a survey). We depart from Teubner's or Ladeur’s 
analyses of procedural regulation and proceduralization in 
terms of relations between legal and non-legal systems and 
reflexive-responsive regulation (Teubner, 1993; Ladeur, 2001), 
including participation of civil society in public decision-
making (Black, 2000). 
We take ‘procedure’ to mean organizational features beyond 
the outcome of market behaviors. This concept is inspired by 
Montagne’s analysis. In this respect, we expand on her analysis 
of legal control of fund managers in the U.S. (Montagne, 2006, 
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2013). According to the author, managers' legal duties towards 
employees benefiting from a pension plan, as well as towards 
the firms contributing to it, are assessed according to the 
standard of investors’ prudence. The managers have a best-
endeavors obligation, i.e. to set up a technological and 
organizational scheme that meets the standards of a modern 
financial industry. In other words, the responsibility of fund 
managers if their funds collapse is assessed on their 
organizational and technological skills rather than on the 
observed outcome of their behavior. This is what Montagne 
analyzes as the procedural assessment of a prudent investor, for 
instance in terms of duty of care
1
 (Montagne, 2013). Following 
Montagne’s perspective, we stress the procedural issue: aside 
from the observed outcomes on the market, we argue that 
internal and/or organizational features tend to become a key 
issue in financial supervisors' enforcement policies.  
The article is based on empirical research into pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary sanctions imposed by the Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers (AMF), the regulator that has enforced financial 
regulation in France since 2003. The analysis covers the period 
2006-2011, which includes the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
Examining the database containing all the AMF's sanction 
decisions yields one major finding: over time, the AMF 
Enforcement Committee has focused increasingly on the 
internal organizational structures of financial firms rather than 
on their compliance with substantive financial regulation.   
This evolutionary process can be summed up by saying that the 
AMF had moved from substantial to procedural control of the 
finance industry. As a newly created authority, the AMF started 
out with a mainly legalistic framework for compliance, 
focusing on observed outcomes of financial behaviors and on 
market practices. The outcomes were then assessed as 
compliant or non-compliant with substantive regulation, i.e. 
concerning the substance of legal categories of fraud (insider 
trading, disclosure or use of false information, etc.). As the 
AMF became a more stable organization with established 
routines, it reined back its commitment to substantive control 
                                                          
1
 OECD states that the prudent investor has a “duty of care”: “The duty to 
act prudently imposes a standard of behaviour on trustees and other 
fiduciaries under which they must exercise such care and skill as persons of 
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with their own property. “ 
(OECD, 2002). 
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and focused increasingly on issues of intra-organizational 
control of financial firms (brokers, portfolio managers, 
investment funds, etc.). This backshift, from outcomes to firms' 
internal organization, reveals a gradual but major 
transformation of the AMF's precedents for regulating financial 
markets. It should be noted that such a tendency is not specific 
to the AMF. Several case studies, for instance in the U.K., put 
the emphasis on the unsuitability of a legal response based on 
criminal law for dealing with final fraud or misconduct in the 
current context. Since financial markets regulators seem 
uncertain of being able to prosecute such behaviors 
successfully, they tend to focus on persuasive and self-
regulatory approaches alternatives to sanction and deterrence 
(Lokanan, 2015). The deterrence model is increasingly giving 
way to one based on procedural regulation.  
Section 1 gives a brief overview of the AMF. Section 2 
presents key empirical results. Section 3 expands on the 
analytical and theoretical issues raised by our argument in 
terms of procedural regulation. 
 
Section 1- Institutions and Regulatory Framework 
1. Formation of the AMF 
From a legal viewpoint, the AMF is an independent 
administrative agency vested with the power to sanction non-
compliance with financial regulation, as laid down in France's 
Financial and Monetary Code. It is also vested with the power 
to sanction non-compliance with the law. The AMF's policy is 
laid down in various documents posted on its website, 
including the General Regulation and other policy documents.  
The AMF was established by the Financial Security Act passed 
in August 2003
2
. The formation of the AMF rationalized and 
unified an institutional blueprint that had previously been 
dispersed among three among three institutions – Conseil des 
marchés financiers, Commission des opérations de bourse, and 
Conseil de discipline de la gestion financière –  responsible for 
punishing financial misconduct and fraud. 
The AMF can decide two types of sanction, disciplinary and 
pecuniary, which can be decided by a body called the 
                                                          
2
  Loi n° 2003-706 de sécurité financière.  
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Enforcement Committee. Pecuniary sanctions are intended to 
be dissuasive, while disciplinary sanctions punish non-
compliant or fraudulent behavior by finance professionals, and 
ban individuals from the market on a temporary or permanent 
basis. 
The maximum amount of pecuniary sanctions has been revised 
several times since the AMF was formed in 2003. Initially, the 
law set a ceiling of 1.5 million euros. The Economic 
Modernization Act passed in August 2008 increased the 
maximum possible pecuniary sanction to 10 million euros (or 
ten times the profit earned from the unlawful practice)
3
. In 
2010, a new law, the Banking and Financial Regulation Act (loi 
n° 2010-1249 du 22 octobre 2010 de régulation bancaire et 
financière), passed in the context of the subprime crisis, raised 
the ceiling to 100 million euros (or ten times profits earned 
from non-legal practice
4
).  
It should be noted that these figures concern a segment of the 
profession only, namely investment services providers, 
regulated professionals, and natural or legal persons convicted 
of market abuse. French law separates market abuse from 
failure to comply with professional duties, which is considered 
less serious.  For natural persons acting on behalf an investment 
services provider or for regulated corporate entities, the 
maximum penalty is 15 million euros (compared with 1.5 
million euros before 2010). 
 
2. Legal Policy on Financial Markets 
“The AMF regulates participants and products on French 
financial markets, including:  financial markets and market 
infrastructures, listed companies, financial intermediaries 
authorized to provide investment services and financial 
investment advice (credit institutions authorized to provide 
investment services, investment firms, investment management 
companies, financial investment advisers, direct marketers), 
                                                          
3
 Loi n°2008-776 de modernisation de l’économie. 
4
 Note that the legal provisions make sense in a deterrence framework. 
According to Gary Becker (1968), the optimal fine should be defined as the 
additional gain earned from rule-breaking, divided by the probability of 
being sanctioned. In other words, if the probability of being fined by the 
courts is 10%, the optimal sanction in terms of deterrence will be ten times 
the improper financial gain. 
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[and] collective investment products invested in financial 
instruments.” (AMF website, as at June 23, 2014). 
Alongside the Financial and Monetary Code, the AMF has 
issued several influential communications and guides, the most 
important being the General Regulation, which is binding. 
Together with a series of instructions, positions, and 
recommendations posted on its website, the AMF rulings are 
part of a more comprehensive gap-filing process, insofar as the 
way it interprets the general and abstract rules of the Code is 
made known to the financial industry: “When read in 
conjunction with past decisions handed down by the 
Enforcement Committee and the grounds for certain individual 
decisions, the AMF’s published policy allows market 
participants to understand how the AMF applies – under the 
supervision of the courts – the laws and regulations governing 
matters within its jurisdiction.” (AMF website, as at July 28, 
2014).  
Since the AMF is an administrative agency, its remit is to 
police the market. From a legal and administrative viewpoint, 
its main tool is sanctions. Owing to its institutional status, the 
AMF is a disciplinary administrative agency. However, senior 
AMF executives claim that the agency's remit is to deter 
infringements of laws and regulations. Several key official 
reports (e.g. Nocquet, 2013) and newspaper interviews confirm 
the prevalence of this policy of deterrence
5
.  
It is worth emphasizing how much the AMF's soft law 
influences its decisional practices and leeway in terms of 
regulating the financial industry. The effective legal framework 
is the product of soft law stemming from guidelines, 
communications, and statements of the regulator's own 
decisional practice. If these elements are grounded in statute 
law, they offer significant margins of discretion for an 
independent administrative authority, offering additional legal 
resources that can enhance deterrence. The legal resources 
                                                          
5
 Note that the prevalence of the deterrence approach in the fining policy 
often emerges gradually through decisional practice and is ultimately 
confirmed through soft law. This has been the case with European 
competition law. The deterrence objective was enshrined by the Court of 
Justice in its ruling “Musique Diffusion Française” (June 7th, 1983), which 
upheld a Commission decision imposing a significant fine for a breach of 
competition law. Subsequently, the Commission's 1996 guidelines defining 
its methods for setting pecuniary fines confirmed the overriding importance 
of this objective. 
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stemming from soft law can enhance deterrence (by 
determining how the fines are set) or can provide stakeholders 
with additional information and legal certainty for alternative 
ways to close cases. As a consequence the regulatory powers of 
the AMF exceed the sole capacity to deter non-compliant 
behaviors through fines. Soft law is part of a less vertical model 
of regulation, which puts greater emphasis on the procedural 
dimension and less on sanctioning outcomes (see for instance 
Brunner, 2015). Thus the AMF can depart from its deterrence 
policy and opt for a more remedy-based approach. Negotiated 
procedures, such as composition administrative (settlement), 
make sense from this perspective because the stress is on 
compliance policy. It may also be noticed that the capacity to 
incentivize financial market participants to adopt this regulation 
mindset depends heavily on whether the threat of fines is 
effective. In other words, a deterrence policy is a necessary first 
step towards implementing such a procedure-based regulation 
model. 
However the role of soft law and the increasing proportion of 
cases closed through settlement raise the issues of the 
discretionary power of the AMF as an independent 
administrative body and of its judicial control (Conseil d’Etat, 
2014). 
Last but not least, the AMF's regulatory practice is more 
complex than its institutionally-defined missions, involving a 
mix of punishment, dissuasion, compensation, and cooperation 
with the financial industry to repair some of the latter's major 
organizational failures. This aspect will be addressed later on.  
Notice that the deterrence policy is not at all empirically 
testable. Compensation of victims (savers and investors) is 
rarely explicit in the decisions issued by the Enforcement 
Committee. The disgorgement of illegal profits is explicitly 
analyzed in some rare cases.  
 
Section 2- Empirical Analysis 
We now turn to an empirical analysis of AMF sanction 
decisions. We collected all the decisions issued in 2006, 2008 
and 2011 from the AMF's website on the grounds that since the 
AMF was set up in mid-2003, we considered that 2006 
corresponds to more than two full years of sanction practices 
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constituting an organizational learning process. In terms of 
numbers of decisions, 2008 marked a peak, while 2011's 
decisions concerned the infractions that occurred during the 
financial crisis starting in 2007 in the wake of the subprime 
collapse. Since a sanction procedure lasts between two and 
three years, the decisions issued in 2011 relate to events that 
occurred in 2008-2009. 
 
2006 2008 2011 
Mean  518,746 610,334 376,351 
Median  50,000 150,000 175,000 
Min 
(individuals) 5,000 5,000 10,000 
Max 
(individuals) 1,770,480 5,000,000 300,000 
Min (firms) 5,000 10,000 10,000 
Max (firms) 7,117,668 1,000,000 4,470,000 
Table 1- Pecuniary sanctions (in current euros) 
1. Data 
The decisions we collected have been coded. The extracted data 
concern: the identity and type of incriminated individual(s) and 
organization(s), the date an investigation was opened, the 
number and type of claims made against the correspondents 
and finally enforced, the type of sanction, and the size of the 
fine. Since the claims are defined by law, we were able to 
obtain a precise view of the infractions committed by each 
natural and legal person involved in a proceeding. 
2. Results 
2.1.Overview 
The first issue we raise here is whom does the AMF sanction?  
Sanctions can be taken against both individuals and legal 
entities. Both kinds of person can be sanctioned in a same 
decision. Figure 1 shows the distribution of sanctions, with a 
peak for individuals in 2008, regardless of whether these 
penalties were issued in a specific decision, or in conjunction 
with those issued to corporate entities. By contrast, the number 
of individuals falls sharply in 2011, seemingly evidencing a 
tendency by the AMF to de-personalize its penalties. The same 
trend can be also observed in the U.S.A. This is especially 
important because these cases are commonly closed through 
settlement procedures in which firms first negotiate immunities 
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for their staff (McDonald, 2012). This kind of procedure 
effectively corrects market practices but may be questioned in 
terms of incentives, since the fine negotiated by a firm can be 
seen as its cost of doing business!
6
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Types of persons sanctioned 
Going into more a more detailed analysis, it is worth 
distinguishing between legal persons and individuals. Figure 2 
exhibits the types of legal persons sanctioned. We see a clear 
trend towards sanctioning the financial industry (investment 
service providers and investment funds), while the number of 
sanctions on listed companies breaching regulations of mergers 
and acquisitions and insider trading decreases. 
 
                                                          
6
 “Not only does the corporation get to avoid reputational harm and any 
collateral risks that such harm may impose, but the individuals involved— 
charged or uncharged—are able to walk away virtually untarnished”, 
McDonald, p.433. 
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Figure 2– Categories of legal persons sanctioned  
Concerning private individuals, we note a diversification of the 
status and functions of those sanctioned (Figure 3). Before 
2008, no executives, lawyers, or private investors were 
involved in a sanctioning proceeding. CEOs and high-level 
managers are, in relative terms, sanctioned to a lesser extent in 
2011 than in previous years.  
 
Figure 3 – Types of individual sanctioned 
The most common sanction is a pecuniary penalty (Figure 4). A 
combination of fines and disciplinary sanctions was scarce for 
all three years under review. From 2011 onward the proportion 
of Enforcement Committee decisions including at least one 
clearance of liability and, subsequently, no sanction is smaller 
than previously. This may be interpreted as an indicator of the 
stricter policy on misconduct that the Committee adopted in the 
wake of the 2007-2008 subprime crisis.  
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Figure 4 –Types of sanctions 
 
We now turn to the kinds of misconduct that the AMF 
sanctions. 
2.2.A Process of Judiciarization of Internal 
Organization 
Below we describe practices characterized as market offenses 
or offenses related to deficiencies in firms' internal 
organization: 
- Market offenses relating to fraud and misconduct 
which directly affect the information disclosed to 
the market. These consist of insider trading, 
disclosure or use of privileged information, 
manipulation of information, stock-price 
manipulation, and breach of the duty to inform 
customers.  
- Internal organizational deficiencies arising within 
financial firms, and consisting of a series of internal 
shortcomings, such as: mis-management of conflicts 
of interest (absence of “Chinese walls”), lack of 
internal and compliance control (lack of appropriate 
human or technological capabilities, non-referral to 
an ethics or compliance officer, etc.), insufficient 
risk management and lack of compliance with 
prudential rules, non-respect of investment rules, 
deficiencies in compliance management standards 
(investment, diversification, hedging, etc.), breach 
of rules governing the trading (delivery, entry in 
functional accounts, data recording and retention…)  
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Figure 5 – Deficiencies in internal organization and control   
(% of total sanctions per year) 
 
While sanctions for professional misconduct in terms of 
internal organization and control account for 15.4% of 
decisions in 2006, this rises to 21% in 2008 and almost doubles 
to 40% in 2011. 
We thus observe a shift from sanctions punishing dissemination 
of misleading financial information (on the financial position of 
companies issuing securities, primarily on the secondary 
market) to penalties for shortcomings in practical risk control 
and compliance monitoring by the financial industry and firms' 
internal organization. In the U.S., the enforcement actions taken 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against 
broker-dealers in 2005, 2006 and the first four months of 2007 
focus to a significant extent on violations related to 
organizational failures. More precisely, as shown by Gadinis 
(2012), violations such as failure to maintain appropriate books 
and records, and to supervise employees, along with internal 
control failures, and late trading, are mainly dealt with in 
administrative proceedings rather than court action. According 
to Gadinis’s data, these types of violations account for 34.9% 
of the cases handled through administrative proceedings, and 
only 0.4% of those that go through the courts (Gadinis, 
2012:94-96). Gadinis argues that “…the SEC assigned fraud-
based violations predominantly to courts, while violations 
relating to supervisory failures were more likely to result in 
administrative proceedings” (Gadinis 2012:94).   
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As a matter of fact, a series of decisions taken in the recent 
years sanction internal control failures (De Vauplane, 2012): 
- A fund manager was sanctioned for outsourcing internal 
control but failing to ensure its effectiveness. However, 
the external accounting firm to which control had been 
outsourced "did not provide a sufficiently 
comprehensive and regular management activity 
control" while for the Enforcement committee "any 
fund manager must always have the resources, 
organization and procedures of control and monitoring 
in line with its activities." (AMF – Enforcement 
Committee, decision October 23, 2008)  
- A fund manager was sanctioned for having insufficient 
resources to value portfolios, since any fund manager is 
required to have adequate and sufficient means to fulfill 
the obligation to conduct its own asset valuation both at 
the time of acquisition and throughout the life of the 
financial asset, especially in the case of complex 
products such as Euro Medium-Term Notes (AMF – 
Enforcement Committee, decision April 7, 2011).  
- Two fund managers were punished for control and 
monitoring failures related to the fraud orchestrated by 
Bernard Madoff until 2008. The Committee found that 
both companies had failed in their duties of care and 
professionalism in controlling risky investments for 
third parties."(AMF – Enforcement Committee, two 
decisions, October 21, 2011). 
- Société Générale Asset Management (SGAM) was 
sanctioned for the way it managed its enhanced cash 
funds at the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007-
2008. These funds invested in subprime-related assets 
without informing customers. Société Générale had 
bought back shares and units from customers wishing to 
exit the funds, but this was done under organizational 
conditions sanctioned by the AMF: SGAM involved its 
risk control and compliance team in the cash 
management process. Staff from the risk control and 
compliance office were closely involved at several key 
moments in the process of determining the sale price of 
the assets. Thus, no one was able to control the process, 
and assets were mis-valued. (AMF Enforcement 
Committee, two decisions, October 7, 2011). 
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It is worth underlining that the AMF mitigates its sanctions if 
the incriminated entity changes its internal organization while 
an Enforcement Committee proceeding is underway. Thus in 
2011 several of the Committee's decisions clarified a new AMF 
policy, which consists in reducing a penalty when the entity in 
question, whether an investment services provider or a fund 
manager, has made tangible changes to its internal organization 
or its stock-pricing and valuation technology. (B*Capital, 5 
May 2011; Société X, 7 April 2011; EMI France, 21 October 
2011; OFI Asset Management, 30 June, 2011). These examples 
illustrate the trade-off within the sanction policy between fines 
and behavioral penalties. Even if the latter can replace the 
former in a procedural regulation framework, they remain 
essential in terms of compliance incentives.  
Section 3- Law and Financial Markets 
Enforcement of financial regulation deserves to be considered 
as part of the broader issue of interconnection between law and 
finance. Broadly speaking, the changing pattern of sanctions 
analyzed so far provides evidence of a dynamic relationship 
between the public institution responsible for enforcement and 
the market. The AMF's sanctioning practice is grounded only 
marginally in laws and regulation; it relies mostly its own rules 
and precedents
7
. Having a certain degree of discretion, the 
AMF Enforcement Committee has been able to implement a 
learning process about what is considered the best way to 
regulate securities markets and their participants through 
sanctions proceedings. In other words, the changes in the 
AMF's enforcement precedents and practice over time are the 
sign of a reflexive relationship between the regulator and the 
market participants it oversees (Black, 2013).  
In addition, the process of legalization of financial entities' 
internal organization stresses the fuzziness of the boundaries 
between law and markets. Like antitrust and competition law, 
legal regulation is built on the principle of punishing non-
compliant behaviors on the market. Our argument of a beyond-
market-behavior regulation converges with the idea that a new 
policy of risk prevention seems to be expanding. The 
                                                          
7
  The soft law issued by independent administrative authorities, such as 
guidelines for fining policy, are not binding on the courts responsible for 
judicial control of those authorities' decisions. However, as illustrated by EU 
competition law, even judicial control tends to adopt a procedural approach, 
confining it to an assessment of whether the agency's decisions comply with 
its own guidelines. 
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proceduralization of regulation may be considered as a process 
for building a risk prevention system. In this regard, Michael 
Power (2013) deserves attention. Developing upon a 
Foucauldian approach to the apparatus (dispositif) of fraud risk, 
he argues that the idea of preventing risk rather than punishing 
a risk that has occurred is a major shift in regulatory policies: 
regulation encourages the creation of internal organizations 
capable of preventing the risk of fraud. Power’s analysis echoes 
our own in the field of financial regulation. Paradoxically, 
however, this focus on internal organization could damage the 
interest of savers and investors due to the separation of 
financial activities and compliance management.  
Furthermore, the normativity of law extends beyond the scope 
of the market and enters into the internal organization of firms. 
This result is in line with the main arguments of law and 
organization analysts such as Edelman & al. (1999) or Sitkin 
and Bies (1993). The process of legalization of internal 
organization schemes in the private sector finance also 
underscores the hybrid character of finance (i.e. between State 
and market) (Pistor, 2013). Edelman and Stryker (2005) 
recognize that “organizations are highly responsive to their 
legal environments on the law-related aspects of organizational 
fields” (2005: 532). In their perspective, "legal environments" 
have a variety of components: formal law, and the sanctions 
associated with it, informal practices and norms regarding the 
use or non-use of law, and ideas about the meaning of law 
(Edelman and Stryker 2005: 532). However, the construction of 
internal control mechanisms within financial firms is largely 
structured by formal law and, in France, by AMF sanctions. In 
specific cases, these sanctions are in addition to international, 
European and nationally binding provisions – from Basel 
Committee principles to the French Financial and Monetary 
Code regarding the control of risks in banking and finance. The 
empirical study reported here gives more evidence on the role 
of formal law and sanctions than on informal practices and 
ideas about what law is. The AMF policy actually consists in 
putting legal pressures on financial firms so that they take 
corrective actions when designing their organizational and 
decisional arrangements.  
Enforcement of regulation is a key issue for socio-legal 
research. Coglianese and Kagan (2007) stress the prevalence of 
two dominant perspectives: legalistic and social. Enforcement 
16 
 
as a legal process means that the regulatory agency punishes 
violations of law. This implies an adversarial, non-cooperative 
regulatory practice. The second view is social: enforcement 
becomes a social process implying a dialogue between the 
regulator and regulated entities, with a dose a cooperation and a 
focus on problem-solving rather than punishment. Coglianese 
and Kagan consider that “many regulatory agencies claim that 
they strive for a flexible enforcement style: legalistic and 
punitive when needed, but accommodative and helpful in 
others […].” (Coglianese & Kagan, 2007, xviiii). Legalism and 
punishment on one side, cooperation on the other, are 
complementary in regulatory practice. As a matter of fact, the 
practice of the AMF Enforcement Committee consists less in 
punishing fraud and misconduct as such than in inducing 
financial firms to achieve intra-organizational changes. One the 
main tools used by the AMF is mitigating its pecuniary 
sanctions if a firm makes necessary changes in the course of a 
proceeding before the Enforcement Committee. The AMF's 
precedents are closely looked at by auditing firms and 
consultants, who issue advice about the regulator's expectations 
on internal control, compliance officers, risk management, and 
other key intra-organizational issues. The growing number of 
recommendations on internal control made by auditors and 
consultants, although not investigated as such in this paper, 
give a significant idea of their contribution to the process of 
managerialization of the law (Power, 2013). This process 
echoes the increasing tendency of regulatory agencies to 
implement negotiated procedures that are more or less based on 
horizontal-type bargaining with stakeholders. This can lead to 
contractualization, as demonstrated by the U.S. model of 
settlement. 
The proceduralization of financial regulation can also be 
interpreted in terms of delegation of enforcement. As stated 
earlier, beyond in addition to sanctioning organizational 
failures within financial firms, the financial regulator also 
mitigates the amount of fines if the firm improves its internal 
organization in the course of a sanction proceeding. These facts 
evidence a process of delegating regulation from the financial 
supervisor to financial firms themselves. Through 
proceduralization, the supervisor gives incentives and 
responsibilities to firms, encouraging them to behave in a more 
socially responsible way, and to be more legally compliant 
when operating in the market.  
17 
 
As a matter of fact, when a firm improves its contested 
organizational arrangements during a sanction proceeding, the 
AMF Enforcement Committee regards this cooperative 
behavior as a legitimate motive for lowering the fine. The 
AMF's recent settlement policy underscores its shift towards 
procedural control
8
. Indeed, since 2011 the AMF has been 
vested with the power to reach a settlement with an entity 
whose misconduct is not harmful enough to justify a costly and 
lengthy sanction proceeding. If accepted by the wrongdoer, the 
settlement does not imply a recognition of guilt; both parties 
negotiate the introduction of a compliance plan and the 
payment of an amount of money to the State.  
This trend can be analyzed within very different theoretical 
frameworks. In microeconomic terms, it could be seen as an 
optimal expedient for the regulator to delegate monitoring to a 
second body – the financial firm itself. As external regulation 
of firm behavior is both costly and difficult – if not impossible 
– to implement, the regulator may provide efficient incentives 
to firms’ executives and managers by adopting this kind of 
procedural regulation. Within a principal-agent framework, the 
firm's management becomes a delegated principal that monitors 
the agent. The interests of both the regulatory body and 
financial firms are more efficiently aligned since the burden of 
proof is considerably lightened for the administrative authority. 
At the same time, this model of delegation may prevent 
incoherent incentive schemes. The possibility that firms will be 
fined because of shortcomings in their internal control system 
tends to make them less inclined to set up evaluation or 
remuneration systems that might encourage staff to take 
excessive risks or play dangerously with the rules. In 
consequence, operational staff are less likely to be exposed to 
conflicting incentives vis-à-vis market rules. In addition, such a 
delegation scheme may address the issue of the “fraud triangle” 
consisting of internal pressures to maximize financial returns, 
rule-breaking opportunities due to weak internal controls, and a 
professional culture that refuses to see financial regulations and 
the associated sanctions as legitimate.   
However, an alternative story can be told. The choice of a 
procedural regulation model may be driven by efficiency. In 
this case, however, efficiency is not to be understood from the 
                                                          
8
 Decree n° 2011-968 of 16 August 2011 on the sanctioning powers of the 
AMF and the settlement procedure. 
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standard perspective of economic optimization. Rather, it is a 
pragmatic adjustment to the fact that regulators are finding it 
harder and harder to punish increasingly complex financial 
misconduct because they lack the budgetary, technical, and 
human resources to do so. Putting the accent on internal control 
failures makes it possible to alleviate the burden of proof and to 
close cases more quickly and efficiently. Likewise, relying on 
soft law sources and promoting negotiated procedures – such as 
composition administrative – reduces the risk of appeals and 
also enhances the legal certainty associated with the regulatory 
body that is making the ruling. This solution may allow the 
regulator to concentrate its resources on cases that are more 
important. 
 
Conclusion 
Legalization of the internal organization of private financial 
firms is an ongoing process in connection with sanction-based 
financial regulation in France. As noticed by Edelman & al. 
(1999) within the socio-legal field of law and organization, the 
internal structure of private entities does not stand outside the 
law. This specifically confirms the insightful statement made 
by Katharina Pistor, who promotes a legal theory of finance, 
that “finance is legally constructed; it does not stand outside the 
law" (Pistor, 2013: 315). 
Critical accounting theorists put the emphasis of the fact that 
fraud is a social construct, with the legal dimension as an 
important component of the social construction (Cooper, Dacin, 
Palmer 2013: 441). In this regard, what is fraud varies 
according to context and over time. It therefore is of major 
importance to contextualize fraud within a specific political, 
economic, social and legal pattern, and to recognize the social 
construction of fraud and associated categories of wrongdoing. 
The focus of this paper is on the variation of the AMF's 
construction of fraud over time; its variation across space may 
be the subject of further comparative research.  
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